



# W I R E L E S S F I L E

Number 134  
July 13, 1992

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Q: On this operation.

A: Well, we didn't take the decision until 11:30 a.m. I don't know what time he talked to you.

Q: How quickly might those ships be in place for the new monitoring duty? A week?

A: I think it could be fairly promptly, couldn't it? Pretty quick? About a week.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

Q: On Milosevic, sir, no comment with a smile?

A: No, flat no comment with a straight face. No smile.

(end transcript)

EUR504

07/10/92

**CSCE HELSINKI DOCUMENT 1992: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE**  
(Text: U.S. delegation fact sheet) (1160)

(The U.S. delegation to the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe issued the following fact sheet July 10 entitled "CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change.)

The 1992 Helsinki Document establishes new methods of consultation and concerted action among CSCE participating states to meet new challenges. It proceeds from the assumption that change will be the watchword of the years ahead. It rejects static concepts of stability and seeks to establish a system of dynamic management of democratic change as the foundation of future actions.

The Helsinki results are divided into two sections:

-- the "Helsinki Declaration" which sets forth a solemn political commitment to implement the Helsinki program; and

-- the "Helsinki Decisions" in 12 chapters which cover the main areas of concern among CSCE participating states.

The Helsinki Declaration reaffirms the centrality of human rights and democratic institutions to the search for peace in Europe. It holds all participating states accountable for their actions and makes clear that the fulfillment of CSCE commitments by one state is a matter "of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states."

The declaration notes also that, despite important progress, there have also been major disappointments. For the first time in decades there is warfare in the CSCE region. Violence has led to tragic consequences. The participating states reaffirm their determination to work against such violence. They stress their determination to make parties to conflicts responsible for their actions. This determination was especially evident in the July 8 decision to remove Serbia from CSCE meetings.

Highlights of the Helsinki Decisions include:

-- more coherent structures to enable CSCE to better organize for the tasks ahead. Included are new, more effective groupings ("Troika"; "Steering Groups"), enhanced authority for the chairman foreign minister, and clearer provisions for fact finding missions. (chapter I)

-- establishment of the "CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities." This is to an eminent personality who will serve an early warning function by investigating tensions arising from ethnic or minority problems. (chapter II)

-- extensive procedures for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes. A clear structure has been established to strengthen CSCE's ability to prevent and manage crises, including: a) early warning and prevention action; b) political management of crisis; c) use of instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management; and d) CSCE peacekeeping.

This structure is based on CSCE's broad concept of security, which focuses on the underlying causes of tensions. This structure is politically based. It does not depend on treaties or formal agreements and acts on the basis of consensus among members. Its detailed provisions give CSCE for the first time an orderly set of procedures with which to pursue its goals of preventing and managing crisis.

The early warning phase concentrates on human rights and democratic institution building as the most important long-term preventative step. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw assumes a major role in this phase, as does the new High Commissioner on National Minorities.

The political management phase focuses on consultations by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) and political steps to encourage an end to a crisis.

The third phase brings in specific instruments such as fact finding and rapporteur missions and mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes. An important step forward is agreement to commence negotiation of a comprehensive structure for peaceful settlement of disputes, including directed conciliation.

If a crisis persists, the final phase envisages formal peacekeeping operations in support of a political solution, either by CSCE countries directly or with the assistance of international organizations such as NATO and WEU.

-- The fourth chapter of the decisions provides for additional openness with the public and with non-governmental organizations. CSCE should remain open to the public and should not be taken over by diplomats. An important part of this chapter is an invitation to Japan, in formal recognition of its role in worldwide security management, to attend and speak at CSCE meetings, without taking part in decisions.

-- An integrated "Forum for Security Cooperation" has also been established (chapter V). This will be the

only conventional arms control forum existing in Europe. For the first time all members of CSCE will cooperate to lower the danger of military confrontation in Europe.

-- The core of the CSCE process is found in the Human Dimension which is expanded considerably in Chapter VI of the decisions. An improved mechanism for pursuing human rights abuses and encouraging democratic development is provided with the expanded Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The principle of full and regular review of human rights commitments is expanded through agreement on regular implementation meetings. A series of seminars, which will also be open to NGOs, has been agreed in areas such as migration, free media and tolerance to add new substance to the CSCE human dimension.

-- Also expanded (in chapter VII) are structures for economic cooperation within the CSCE process. The main highlight of this chapter is acceptance of a U.S. proposal to establish a CSCE economic forum to be held in Prague. This body will focus on the human and social aspects of economic development. It will seek to identify hindrances to development and to set up means of dealing with them on a political and educational basis.

Taken together, these decisions complement those taken by NATO at the London and Rome summits and the Oslo ministerial, and by the European Community at the Maastricht meeting. They give CSCE the means to join with these organizations and others in an interlocking European and transatlantic structure that can serve as a new foundation for peace in Europe.

CSCE remains the broadest overall framework uniting the countries of the Euro-Atlantic world in a common political endeavor. By establishing standards for behavior and a context in which adherence to those standards can be measured, it is an essential guide to the state of democratic change. Its new structures add weight to the political decisions taken in CSCE bodies. It is thus a natural complement to NATO and the EC. In the years ahead, it will be particularly useful in helping to integrate the new democracies into the democratic world and in providing a vehicle for consultation and early warning about local crises which may emerge.

As the Helsinki Declaration points out, no international effort can be successful if its participating states do not demonstrate the political will to expand peaceful cooperation with each other. Conflicts cannot be contained through peacekeeping or settled through mediation if those engaged in conflict do not have the will to seek peaceful solutions to their differences.

CSCE is a voluntary organization which seeks to build cooperation based on political consensus. The Helsinki meeting has expanded the tools available to help achieve this consensus. Its decisions offer hope for success in the future.

**THE CFE TREATY AND CFE-1A AGREEMENT**

(Text: White House fact sheet) (1450)

(The White House issued the following fact sheet on the CFE Treaty and CFE-1A agreement July 10 in Helsinki.)

**CFE**

The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris in November of 1990 between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. It was ratified by the United States in December of 1991.

CFE's entry into force was delayed primarily because of dissolution of the former Soviet Union. This required the new states with territory in the CFE zone (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) to reach agreement on division of the USSR's treaty obligations and ratify the treaty by action of their new parliaments.

**Treaty Limits**

The CFE Treaty sets equal ceilings from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive operations. Collectively, the 29 treaty participants have agreed that neither side of the old Cold War divide in Europe may have more than:

20,000 tanks  
20,000 artillery pieces  
30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs)  
6,800 combat aircraft  
2,000 attack helicopters

To further limit the readiness of armed forces, the treaty sets equal ceilings on equipment that may be with active units. Other ground equipment must be in designated permanent storage sites. The limits for equipment each side may have in active units are:

16,500 tanks  
17,000 artillery pieces  
27,300 armored combat vehicles (ACVs)

The two groups addressed in the treaty have consulted on the division of these limits by country. The members of NATO have consulted through NATO mechanisms and have agreed on national entitlements.

The treaty limits the proportion of armaments that can be held by any one country in Europe to about one-third of the total for all countries in Europe -- the "sufficiency" rule. These limits are:

13,300 tanks  
13,700 artillery pieces  
20,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs)  
5,150 combat aircraft  
1,500 attack helicopters

### Regional Arrangements

In addition to limits on the number of armaments in each category on each side, the treaty also includes regional limits to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment.

### Destruction

Equipment reduced to meet the ceilings must be destroyed, or, in a limited number of cases, converted to non-military purposes. After the treaty enters into force, there will be a four-month baseline inspection period. Following the four-month baseline inspection period, 25 percent of the destruction must be complete by the end of one year, 60 percent by the end of two years, and all destruction required by the treaty completed by the end of three years.

Large amounts of equipment will be destroyed to meet the obligations of the CFE Treaty. NATO will meet its destruction obligations by destroying its oldest equipment. NATO members with newer equipment, including the United States, have agreed to transfer some of this equipment to allies with older equipment. These transfers will not reduce NATO's destruction obligation. Some 2,000 pieces of U.S. equipment will be transferred to our NATO allies. Also, the United States will destroy some 600 older tanks.

### Verification

The treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction. NATO has established a system to cooperate in monitoring the treaty. Parties have an unlimited right to monitor the process of destruction.

The CFE Treaty is of unlimited duration.

### CFE-1A

Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty called for follow-up negotiations with the objective of concluding agreement on additional measures to strengthen security and stability in Europe, including limitations on military manpower. These negotiations, known as the CFE-1A talks, involved the same participants and used the same mandate as the negotiations on the CFE Treaty. They began in Vienna in November of 1990, and were concluded on July 6, 1992.

### Nature of the Agreement

CFE-1A constitutes a political commitment by its signatories to limit (and, where applicable, reduce) the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A is not a

legally binding agreement, and is not subject to ratification by parliaments.

The heart of the CFE-1A agreement is a "ceiling" on the military personnel of each participating state within the CFE Treaty's area of application (i.e., Europe). Each participating state determined its own ceiling, taking into consideration its national defense plans and security interests. These numerical ceilings were not subject to negotiation among the participants, although the levels were open to discussion prior to adoption of the agreement. They are based on agreed categories of military personnel subject to limitation that apply equally to all. In general terms, the CFE-1A limitation applies to military personnel, based on land and in the area of application, in the following categories of conventional armed forces:

- land and air forces;
- air defense forces (including ground-based, air defense aviation, and all other air defense forces);
- central headquarters, command, and staff elements;
- land-based naval forces that hold equipment subject to the CFE Treaty (including land-based naval aircraft, coastal defense, and naval infantry forces);
- any other forces that hold equipment limited under the CFE Treaty; and
- reserve personnel called up for full-time service for more than 90 days.

The CFE-1A agreement does not limit the personnel of an sea-based naval forces, internal security units, or forces serving under U.N. command.

The United States has declared a manpower limit of 250,000. This figure far exceeds personnel the United States is likely to base in Europe in the foreseeable future. It is high enough to ensure that we are able to meet our commitments to reinforce Europe in a crisis without exceeding agreed limits. It is also consistent with U.S. equipment limits under the CFE Treaty, including that in storage in Europe.

#### Information Exchange

The CFE-1A agreement also provides for a broad, detailed exchange of information on the military manpower of the participating states. Information is to be provided on personnel in the categories under limitation detailed above, and also on personnel serving:

- with forces designed and structured to perform internal security functions during peacetime (excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police forces);
- with any other element (excluding naval) of conventional armed forces; and
- under U.N. command.

In general, information provided for most categories is broken down to show the strength of individual units at the level of brigade/regiment and higher.

## Verification/Evaluation

The regime for evaluating compliance with the declared national limits is modest. This reflects the participants' recognition that evaluating compliance with limits on manpower is, at best, an inexact process. It is also in keeping with the fact that the CFE-1A limitations constitute a political commitment, not a legal obligation.

The evaluation regime in CFE-1A is built on the system of inspections created to verify compliance with the CFE Treaty. In essence, when inspectors arrive at a location to inspect equipment subject to the CFE Treaty, they will also be provided with information on the personnel serving at the site. If the numbers they are given are at variance with the numbers provided in the CFE-1A information exchange, the inspectors will be given an explanation for the discrepancy.

## Stabilizing Measures

To further enhance security and promote transparency among the participating states, the CFE-1A agreement includes three stabilizing measures:

- a measure requiring 42-day advance notification if any state plans to increase the personnel strength of any ground force unit by more than 1,000 or any air force unit by more than 500;
- a measure requiring 42-day advance notification if a state plans to call up more than 35,000 reservists (excepting call-ups made in response to emergency situations, such as natural disasters); and
- a measure stating that any personnel resubordinated to forces not subject to limitation (e.g., internal security forces) will nonetheless remain subject to limitation for 1-2 years.

## Time Frame of the CFE-1A Agreement

CFE-1A enters into force on July 17, 1992 simultaneously with provisional application of the CFE Treaty. Its provisions are of unlimited duration. The national ceilings declared by each state take effect 40 months after entry into force. Information on manpower is to be exchanged initially within 30 days of entry into force, and annually thereafter. More detailed information on certain categories of manpower, broken down to show units at the brigade/regiment level, will be provided after 40 months, as an aid to evaluating whether a state is observing its manpower limit.

EUR506

07/10/92

## U.S. NOTES "GREAT IMPORTANCE" OF HELSINKI CFE ACCORD (Text: White House statement) (900)

Washington -- The United States attaches "great importance" to the agreement reached by the leaders of 29 nations in Helsinki that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty "will be applied provisionally on July 17, 1992, to enter into force this fall," a White House spokesman says.



In a statement released July 10, spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the agreement, which will include full participation by the original signatories and eight new states of the former Soviet Union, "is a key indication of the new states' commitment to achieving lower and more stable levels of conventional military forces in Europe."

The treaty, signed in November 1990 by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the former Warsaw Pact, established equal ceilings for conventional equipment in the zone extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. It now also applies to the newly independent states in the CFE zone: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova.

The United States, Fitzwater said, has "worked hard" to make reductions in conventional military equipment in Europe "a reality." He said the agreement was achieved "because all participants, east and west, recognized that CFE's unprecedented force reductions, information exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to further improve European security in the years ahead."

Fitzwater said President Bush also signed in Helsinki the CFE-1A agreement to limit military manpower levels in Europe after the negotiations concluded in Vienna July 6. The new political commitment on personnel, agreed to by the original CFE signatories, is designed to strengthen security and stability and promote openness on the European continent.

The agreement does not limit the personnel of sea-based naval forces, internal security units or United Nations command forces.

Since CFE-1A is a politically, but not legally, binding accord, parliaments of the participants are not required to ratify it.

Once implemented, both CFE and CFE-1A accords will apply for an unlimited period of time. CFE-1A enters into force on July 17.

Following are highlights of the two agreements:

#### CFE

-- Twenty-nine nations agreed that "neither side of the old Cold War divide in Europe" will have more than 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters.

-- The agreement sets equal ceilings of equipment which may be assigned to active units: 16,500 tanks, 17,000 artillery pieces and 27,300 ACVs.

-- Each country must limit its proportion of armaments to about one third of the total for all European countries: 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery pieces, 20,000 ACVs, 5,150 combat aircraft and 1,500 attack helicopters.

-- Inspections will be held for a four-month period after the accord enters into force; 25 percent of the equipment destruction must be finished at the end of one year, 60 percent after two years, and all of it by the end of three years.

## CFE-1A

-- In the follow-up negotiations, the CFE signatories agreed to limit conventional manpower levels in Europe, including land and air forces, air defense forces, central headquarters, command and staff elements and land-based naval forces with CFE-limited equipment.

-- They agreed that the manpower information exchange -- to begin 30 days after the accord enters into force and continuing annually thereafter -- should apply to forces assigned to internal security functions in peacetime, forces under U.N. command and any other conventional elements except for naval.

-- Stabilizing measures include a 42-day advance notification requirement should any countries decide to boost ground force unit personnel by more than 1,000 or air force units by more than 500, and 42 days of advance notice if more than 35,000 reservists are called up for anything other than an emergency, such as a natural disaster.

Following is the text of Fitzwater's statement:

(begin text)

Today, at the Helsinki Summit, President Bush, along with the leaders of 28 other European nations, agreed that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) will be applied provisionally on July 17, 1992, to enter into force this fall with the full participation by the original signatories and the eight new states of the former Soviet Union with territory in CFE's zone of application.

The United States attaches great importance to this event because joining CFE is a key indication of the new states' commitment to achieving lower and more stable levels of conventional military forces in Europe. Along with our treaty partners, the United States has worked hard to make CFE a reality. In the end, it was achieved because all participants, east and west, recognized that CFE's unprecedented force reductions, information exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to further improve European security in the years ahead.

## CFE-1A

President Bush also signed the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe -- otherwise known as the CFE-1A agreement. CFE-1A negotiations began shortly after the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. The CFE-1A accord places politically binding limits on military manpower in Europe. Along with the equipment limits of the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A establishes comprehensive and stable levels of conventional military forces on the continent.

(end text)